

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1722

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0415

LIMDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: US/SOVIET BILATERALS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS COMMENTS BY SOVIET REPS
SHUSTOV AND KAPITONOV IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS JULY 20
AND 21 WITH US REP AND DEP REP. WE ARE SUBMITTING THEM
TELEGRAPHICALLY, TO ASSIST WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN END OF
ROUND EVALUATION. END SUMMARY

2. IN JULY 20 TALK WITH US REP, SHUSTOV BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE
BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY HAD BEEN HELPFUL. ON DATA,
HE SAID THE EAST HAD
DELIBERATELY CHOSEN THE JANUARY 1, 1976 CUT-OFF DATE
FOR ITS DATA, IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL
IN BRINGING THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES CLOSER ON
WHAT THE DATA ARE. HE INDICATE ALSO THAT PICKING A
DEFINITE CUT-OFF DATE HAD BEEN RESPONSIVE TO AN ERLIER

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SUGGESTION BY US REP. HE MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT

IT HAD BEEN THREE YEARS SINCE THE WEST HAD TABLED OUR DATA, AND THAT WESTERN DATA HAD PRESUMABLY CHANGED IN THE INTERVAL.

3. US REP NOTED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD FREQUENTLY INDICATED THAT WESTERN DATA HAD NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY. US REP SAID THAT THE WEST'S NEW DATA, WHEN WE TABLED IT, WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE DATA ALREADY TABLED, AND THAT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TOTALS FOR WESTERN AND FOR EASTERN MANPOWER REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME. THE OVERALL LEVEL OF WESTERN FORCES, IN ANY EVENT, WAS VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED. THEREFORE, IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY NARROWING OF THE GAP IN THESE YEARS, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE BECAUSE EASTERN FORCE LEVELS HAD GONE DOWN. WAS THIS WHAT SHUSTOV MEANT?

4. SHUSTOV DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THIS QUESTION. HE SAID THAT FIGURES ON EASTERN 1973 FORCE LEVELS HAD BEEN COMPUTED, BUT HE DID NOT REMEMBER OFF-HAND WHAT THEY WERE. IN ANY CASE, THEY WERE NOW IRRELEVANT.

5. SHUSTOV REFERRED TO BREZHNEV'S REMARKS IN BERLIN ON THE EXISTENCE OF A BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND SAID THAT THESE REMARKS WERE BASED ON THE DATA THE EAST HAD TABLED IN VIENNA.

6. US REP REMARKED THAT THE ACTUAL WORDS BREZHNEV HAD USED HAD BEEN MAKING FOR THREE YEARS IN VIENNA-- NAMELY, THAT THERE WAS AN OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES WHEN ALL TYPES OF FORCES WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

7. GROBEL ASKED WHAT SHUSTOV'S OWN EXPLANATION FOR THE DISCREPANCY IN THE DATA WAS. SHUSTOV IMPLIED THAT HE HAD A THEORY, BUT WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS IT.

8. SHUSTOV MADE QUITE A POINT OF SAYING, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, THAT THE NUCLEAR PORTION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16 HAD CREATED A GOOD IMPRESSION IN MOSCOW. BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT TWO FEATURES OF THIS PROPOSAL HAD MADE A VERY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION: FIRST,
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THE "TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT" CHARACTER OF THE WESTERN OFFER. THE NUCLEARS HAD BEEN TIED, VERY TIGHTLY, TO THE PREVIOUS WESTERN PROGRAM. SECOND, THE FACT THAT THE WEST PROPOSED MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS FOR ITSELF, WHILE THE EAST WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE IN UNITS. THIS WAS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE.

9. US REP POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT

TO GAIN THE CONSENT OF THE ALLIES TO MAKING THE NUCLEAR OFFER. IF WE HAD LEARNED ANYTHING IN THREE YEARS, IT WAS THAT A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE THIS ONE WAS COMPLEX, AND IT WAS A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING OPERATION TO GET PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD.

10. SHUSTOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS APPRECIATED THAT THE WEST HAD MADE A MAJOR CHANGE IN ITS POSITION, AND THAT THE OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS UNPRECEDENTED. SIMILARLY, THOUGH, THE EASTERN TABLING OF DATA WAS A MAJOR INNOVATION FOR THE EAST.

11. SHUSTOV RETURNED THEN TO THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL BY UNITS VERSUS WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, AND INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A VERY SORE POINT FOR THE EAST. THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS NOT EVEN-HANDED.

12. SHUSTOV REFERRED TO A LUNCH HE HAD RECENTLY HAD WITH A US JOURNALIST, IN WHICH LATTER HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF SALT-MBFR LINKAGE. SHUSTOV SAID HE HAD TOLD THE JOURNALIST THAT THE THOUGHT PROGRESS INSALT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO MBFR, BUT THAT FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENTIRELY SEPARATE.

13. SHUSTOV SAID WITH EMPHASIS THAT HE KNEW THAT WHEN MBFR WAS CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN MOSCOW, OR DISCUSSED IN THE POLITBURO, THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED STRICTLY ON ITS OWN, WITHOUT LINKAGE TO SALT. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD NEVER BEEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD BACK IN VIENNA, PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN SALT.

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1723

SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
IRUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0415

LIMDIS

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14. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH US DEPREP SAME DAY, SHUSTOV OPENED BY SAYING THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION SOVIET REPS HAD HAD WITH US REPS THE PREVIOUS DAY AND BEEN VERY HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY AS CONCERNED THE IDEAS THAT THE EAST WAS BEING TOO BROAD IN ITS DEMANDS FOR STAGE ONE COMMITMENTS FOR WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THE POINTS MADE CONCERNING FEDERAL GERMAN SENSITIVITIES TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. THERE WAS AN IMPLICATION IN HIS REMARKS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT MOVE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN A STAGE ONE COMMITMENT BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ONLY AS REGARDS SCOPE AND TIMING AND NOTHING ELSE, AND ALSO THAT THEY MIGHT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVITY AS APPLIED TO CEILINGS, BUT SHUSTOV DID NOT MAKE ANY EXPLICIT STATEMENTS ON THIS.

15. SHUSTOV AGAIN EMPHASIZED, AS HE HAD IN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH US DEPREP ON JULY 9, 1976 THAT SOVIETS WERE
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DELIBERATELY HANGING BACK AND REFRAINING FROM GOING ALL OUT TO PRESS WEST TO TABLE DATA. SHUSTOV SAID HE HOPED THAT, WHEN THE WEST TABLED FIGURES IN THE NEXT ROUND, THESE FIGURES WOULD NOT VARY GREATLY FROM THE WARSAW PACT'S FIGURES ON ITS OWN FORCES. US DEPREP SAID WESTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD BE GUIDED ONLY BY THEIR BEST ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ON A FACTUAL BASIS. WESTERN ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES WERE A JOINT ALLIED PRODUCT. THEY WOULD NOT BE CHANGED UNLESS THE EAST COULD PRODUCE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE WRONG. SHUSTOV THEN STATED THAT THERE WAS A MANPOWER DISPARITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN FAVOR OF THE WARSAW PACT, BUT THAT THIS DISPARITY WAS A RELATIVELY SMALL ONE AND BY NO MEANS AS LARGE AS THE WEST CLAIMED.

16. IN BRIEF SEPARATE DISCUSSION ON JULY 21, SOVIET MILREP COLONEL CAPITANOV SOUGHT OUT US REP AND SAID THAT HE HAD ONE QUESTION WHICH HE WISHED US REP TO CONSIDER DURING THE RECESS.

17. KAPITANOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY THE WESTERN REQUEST THAT THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY. HE ASKED US REP DURING THE RECESS TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOMETHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT THIS ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

18. KAPITANOV THEN SAID THAT, DURING THE RECESS, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER WHAT THE EAST COULD DO TO RESPOND TO THE WESTERN DEMAND THAT RESIDUAL LIMITATIONS BE COLLECTIVE.

19. US REP SAID THAT THE WOULD REVIEW THIS MATTER AND WOULD REEPPOND TO COLONEL KAPITANOV IN THE NEXT ROUND.

20. THERE WAS NO OCCASION TO SUMMARIZE THESE CONVERUIONS TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

21. IT IS INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE REMARKS REPORTED ABOVE THAT SOVIET NOVOSTI BONN CORRESPONDENT
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PORTUGALOV, WHO SEEMED TO ALLOW HIMSELF UNUSUAL LICENSE IN HIS COMMENTS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH FRG REP ON JULY 13 AND US DEPREP ON JULY 15, REPEATEDLY STRESSED THREE MAIN POINTS: (A) THE WESTERN DEMANDS FOR THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OF WHICH THERE WAS ONLY ONE IN THE REDUCTION ARE LOCATED IN THE FORWARD POSITION IN EAST GERMANY WAS INEQUITABLE, BOTH BECAUSE OF WESTERN OFFER TO WITHDRAW BY INDIVIDUALS AND BECAUSE OF DAMAGE THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THIS DUNIT WOULD DO TO WARSAW PACT STRATEGIC POSITION; (B) THE EASTERN DEMAND FOR NATIONAL CEILINGS WAS ADMITTEDLY ILL-CONCEIVED AND SHOULD BE DROPPED; (C) IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF ITS NATO ALLIES RATHER THAN PRESENT DECEMBER 16 ONE-TIME OFFER, THEN IT WAS CERTAIN THAT THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE US COULD BE FOUND.RESOR

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